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Artificial Intelligence (AI) has enormous potential to improve the safety of healthcare, from 
increasing diagnostic accuracy,[1] to optimising treatment planning,[2] to forecasting 
outcomes of care.[3] However, integrating AI technologies into the delivery of healthcare is 
likely to introduce a range of new risks and amplify existing ones. For instance, failures in 
widely used software have the potential to quickly affect large numbers of patients;[4] 
hidden assumptions in underlying data and models can lead to AI systems delivering 
dangerous recommendations that are insensitive to local care processes;[5,6] and opaque AI 
techniques such as deep learning can make explaining and learning from failure extremely 
difficult.[7,8] To maximise the benefits of AI in healthcare, and to build trust amongst 
patients and practitioners, it will therefore be essential to robustly govern the risks that AI 
poses to patient safety. 
 
In a recent review in this journal, Challen and colleagues present an important and timely 
analysis of some of the key technological risks associated with the application of machine 
learning in clinical settings.[9] Machine learning is a subfield of AI that focuses on the 
development of algorithms that are automatically derived and optimised through exposure 
to large quantities of exemplar ‘training’ data.[10]  The outputs of machine learning 
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algorithms are essentially classifications of patterns that provide some sort of prediction—for 
instance, predicting whether an image shows a malignant melanoma or a benign mole.[11] 
Some of the basic techniques of machine learning have existed for half a century or more, but 
progress in the field has accelerated rapidly due to advances in the development of ‘deep’ 
artificial neural networks[12] combined with huge increases in computational power and the 
availability of enormous quantities of data. These techniques have underpinned recent 
public demonstrations of AI systems that display superhuman performance in a range of 
games, such as Go and chess, that have generated a mix of hope, hype and horror about the 
transformative potential—and risks—posed by AI.[13] Away from the headlines, intensive 
efforts are underway to apply machine learning to a variety of clinical tasks, particularly 
those involving the analysis of medical scans and other images,[4] and health systems are 
actively seeking to harness the benefits of AI while also beginning to define principles of 
appropriate conduct.[14,15] 
 
Given this rapid pace of development, Challen et al analyse how machine learning may pose 
risks to patient safety in the short, medium and long term.[9] In the short term, they identify 
safety issues as primarily arising from the reliability and interpretability of predictions made 
by machine learning systems. These issues include mismatches between the data a system is 
trained on and the world it must make predictions about (the problem of ‘distributional 
shift’), and the challenges of understanding and explaining how machine learning systems 
make predictions (the ‘black box’ problem). In the medium term, key safety issues are 
determined to be human over-reliance on the outputs of machine learning systems (the 
problem of ‘automation complacency’), along with the challenges of needing large quantities 
of historical data to train machine learning systems, which will therefore struggle to 
accommodate rapid changes in practice or policy. In the long term, Challen et al point to the 
potential implications of some fundamental technical challenges being grappled with in the 
field of AI safety. These include, for instance, autonomous systems that independently 
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discover novel ways to meet the letter, but not the spirit, of an intended objective (the 
‘reward hacking’ problem), and in so doing cause unintended harm.[9]  
 
Challen and colleagues’ review of these technological sources of risk posed by machine 
learning, combined with accelerating efforts to implement AI, raises a range of urgent 
questions regarding the governance of AI safety in healthcare. Answering these questions 
will require the development of a broad analytical and research framework that includes but 
also extends far beyond the technical issues faced in the operation of specific algorithms. It 
will involve looking backward to the practical activities of defining, developing, testing and 
deploying the models and data that underlie AI systems. And it will involve looking forward 
to the organisational and institutional contexts in which AI tools will be embedded—and in 
which they will sometimes fail.  
 
 
Governing the development of AI 
 
Many of the key safety issues identified by Challen et al both arise from, and need to be 
addressed during, the initial design and development of AI systems. Activities such as 
defining requirements and objectives, collecting and cleaning data, training and testing 
models, and producing user-facing interfaces all involve difficult decisions, necessary trade-
offs and fine-grained human judgements that can have considerable implications for 
safety.[10] Understanding these decisions, and the human and organisational processes that 
underpin them, is critically important to developing a complete picture of the safety of an AI 
system. For example, to properly govern the safety of a machine learning algorithm, it will be 
important to not only ascertain that a system ‘errs on the side of caution’ in its 
predictions.[9] It will also be important to understand how any asymmetric cost ratio that 
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underlies this behaviour was defined and agreed upon,[10] what evidence was drawn on to 
determine this, which stakeholders were involved and on what basis, and whether the 
balance between false positive and false negative errors is appropriate in relation to the work 
systems and safety controls in place in the setting in which the AI tool will be embedded. 
These are also, of course, the sorts of questions that will need to be answered in safety 
investigations when AI systems are involved in future adverse events.  
 
 
Grappling with opacity and inscrutability  
 
A more fundamental challenge to assuring the safety of machine learning systems 
highlighted by Challen et al is that of opacity: the basis of predictions made by some machine 
learning systems, particularly deep neural networks, are effectively an inscrutable ‘black 
box’, taking the form of a distribution of weights over a network rather than a logic that 
might (in principle) be explainable by—and to—humans. Technical solutions, such as 
saliency maps[9] and variable importance plots[10] may help in future. But while the precise 
workings of an algorithm itself may remain inscrutable, it should still be possible to examine 
and explain such things as the design decisions, functional requirements, training activities 
and input data that produce and constrain an AI system and its behaviour—as long as these 
are appropriately documented and auditable.[16] A relevant patient safety analogue might be 
found in current approaches to learning from unexpected adverse events in clinical care. To 
explain these, investigators do not (at present) seek to understand the precise neural basis of 
clinicians’ actions. Rather, in an ideal world they aim to understand what information was 
available at key points, if there were any constraints on decision making or cognition, 
whether there were gaps in knowledge or training, how decisions and actions were 
supervised or checked, and a whole range of other sociotechnical factors.[17] Governing the 
safety of AI technologies in healthcare will require analytical and explanatory frameworks 
that can explain these broader sociotechnical processes, as much as the underlying 
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mechanics of the algorithms themselves. Despite that, irreducible technical inscrutability—
along with the need for large quantities of retrospective training data best suited to a largely 
stable world[18]—may still render some approaches to machine learning unsuitable for 
safety-critical applications.[19]  
 
 
Integrating AI into clinical systems  
 
In addition to safety issues associated with the design and development of AI systems, 
Challen et al importantly draw attention to some risks associated with practical 
implementation. Ensuring that AI technologies ‘fail safe’ when they are unable to make 
reliable predictions is critical. However, ‘failing safe’ can not be fully understood as simply a 
technical property of an AI system declining to provide a prediction when its confidence is 
low,[9] but rather is a sociotechnical property of the entire work system that a technology is 
embedded in. For example, the introduction of AI technologies will likely need to be 
accompanied by targeted strategies to maintain the practical expertise of clinicians and avoid 
long-term deskilling in relation to tasks that become routinely performed by AI.[20] An AI 
tool that occasionally refrains from providing a prediction and hands a task back to a 
deskilled clinician is unlikely to constitute a safe clinical system. Other industries have long 
faced these sociotechnical challenges of automation, as illustrated by the loss of Air France 
447 over the Atlantic Ocean in 2009–a disaster in part initiated by the simple disconnection 
of the aircraft’s autopilot in level cruise due to uncertain data inputs, coupled with the crew’s 
limited experience of manually recovering from flight upsets at high altitude, related to 
broader deskilling across the industry.[21]  
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Governing machines that learn: AI as sociotechnical systems 
 
AI has the potential to transform healthcare in exciting and important ways but will also 
pose new risks to patient safety. To effectively manage these risks, the analysis and 
governance of AI safety must be treated as a fundamentally sociotechnical problem that 
considers the entire human, social and organisational infrastructure that AI technologies 
both emerge from and are embedded in. The field of AI is developing rapidly and in some 
instances new technologies, such as patient-facing symptom checkers, have already been 
deployed on a large scale with limited evaluation[22] in a light-touch regulatory 
environment.[23] Healthcare rapidly needs to develop governance systems, institutions and 
specialists with the expertise and resources to develop robust sociotechnical safety 
requirements and conduct integrated safety analysis of AI systems.[24] In particular, 
mechanisms are needed to detect, analyse and learn from the failures of emerging AI 
technologies, and to take preventative action before serious failures can cause harm to 
patients. At a minimum, AI systems should be subject to rigorous testing and require the 
publication of detailed safety cases[25] that explain and evidence how risks to patient safety 
have been managed both in the technical development and organisational implementation of 
a system—before those systems are used in patient care. Open publication of these reports 
will be particularly important in building trust and acceptance of new AI technologies. Even 
with rigorous testing, technologies still fail. AI systems should therefore incorporate the 
equivalent of airline ‘black box’ recorders to capture data related to safety events[13,19], and 
existing regulatory requirements, institutional structures and social agreements will need to 
be reformulated to ensure that all relevant data and information about AI safety issues can 
be openly shared, robustly investigated and systematically analysed to support accountability 
and learning. Due to the rapid pace of development in AI and its varied applications, as well 
as the continually-learning nature of some AI technologies,[26] systems of AI safety 
governance themselves will need to be adaptive, flexible and able to rapidly learn from 
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experience—and failure. Institutional infrastructures of learning will need to be built around 
these new technologies of learning.[27] 
 
The development of safety governance systems for emerging AI technologies will need to be 
supported by a broad-based programme of interdisciplinary research. Some of the safety 
challenges associated with AI will echo similar challenges encountered in medical 
technology, health informatics, complex automation and organisational safety, but others 
will be novel and unique. Four initial lines of inquiry seem particularly urgent. First, it will 
be important to understand and survey the forms of sociotechnical risks that AI systems are 
likely to introduce into different arenas of healthcare, to develop a coherent map of the safety 
landscape. Second, it will be necessary to identify, develop and adapt models of 
sociotechnical safety—and associated analytical methods—that are well suited to explaining 
and governing the patient safety risks arising from AI. Third, it will be critical to explore 
patient, public and practitioner perspectives on the risks, benefits and acceptability of AI 
systems in healthcare, and the social and institutional mechanisms that may be required for 
acceptance and to build trust. Fourth, it will be necessary to move beyond high level 
principles and examine the practical regulatory functions and concrete governance 
mechanisms that are best suited to assuring the safety of emerging AI systems, and that can 
accommodate the unique challenges of governing technologies that may have the potential to 
act autonomously and continuously learn and adapt. Many of these challenges are being 
actively explored in other sectors, such as the nascent autonomous vehicle industry [27,28] 
which has already experience high-profile safety failures and fatalities[29]. It will therefore 
be important for research and policy in healthcare to both contribute to and learn from these 
broader experiments and debates in AI safety and governance. By drawing attention to some 
key technological risks posed by machine learning, Challen et al[9] provide an important 
step forward and help to start a new conversation about the governance of AI safety in 
healthcare. A core premise of this debate must be that to effectively govern the safety of AI it 
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will be necessary to understand the vulnerabilities of the human and organisational systems 
that create and interact with AI—just as it will be necessary to understand the vulnerabilities 
of AI technologies themselves.  
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